REPORT
2012

Harnessing the skills of migrants and diasporas to foster development:
policy options

Direction générale
de la mondialisation,
du développement
et des partenariats

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS, DEVELOPMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS

HARNESSING THE SKILLS OF MIGRANTS AND DIASPORAS TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT:

POLICY OPTIONS

September 2012

FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

This study was prepared by the OECD in co-operation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The opinions expressed and the arguments advanced in this study do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of France or those of other member countries of the OECD.

Cover picture : Foreign research students at the Institut d'optique
Graduate School in Palaiseau (France) © Courtesy of Jean-François Dars
Execution : DGM
Printing : MAE's reprography office
© French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012
Contacts: jean-christophe.dumont@oecd.org and pierre.robion@diplomatie.gouv.fr

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 4

Better identifying migrants and their skills 6

1. Improving data – the key to a better understanding of diasporas 6
2. More highly educated migrants coming from more diverse origins 7

Facilitating skill transfers and mobility 11

1. Improving access to information about job opportunities 11
2. Improving the match between skills and jobs 13
3. Facilitating recruiting processes and lifting obstacles to return 14

Mobilising diasporas' skills 17

Bolstering co-operation and co-ordination amongst stakeholders 20

Conclusion 22

Bibliography 24

Annex 26

INTRODUCTION

In 1960, there were 77 million migrants in the world – a figure that would nearly triple by 2010, to 214 million, or roughly 3% of the world population. At the same time, the nature and composition of migration movements underwent major changes, driven by the vast socio-economic and geopolitical transformations that characterised the latter half of the 20th century. Decolonisation, European construction, the fall of the Iron Curtain, regional demographic dynamics, the widespread rise in the educational level of the world's population, the emergence of Asian economies and, more broadly, the globalisation of economies were major contributors to remapping international migration flows and reshaping migrant profiles. Host-country migration policies, in many cases more selective, also had an impact on the characteristics of migrants, especially of recent arrivals.

As a result, today's migration flows are characterised by a higher level of skill, a higher proportion of women and a broader range of destination countries than in the past. Many migrants have established roots in their destination countries while at the same time are better connected with their home countries because of easier transport and new tools of communication. Other groups of migrants exhibit forms of hyper-mobility, *e.g.* within free-movement areas or as employees of multinationals. The more "traditional" forms of temporary labour migration are persisting, if not expanding, but here too the expectations of migrants with regard to the ties they maintain with their countries of origin have changed, as has the way they conceive of and deliver on commitments to their home communities.

In part because of these changes, the question of linkages between migration and development has never been more present on the international political agenda than it is today. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, held under the auspices of the United Nations, illustrate the renewed interest in this issue. At the same time, in countries of origin there has been an increase in contacts with diasporas and a strengthening of public institutions relating thereto. Here there has been gradual awareness of the extent of the potential of diasporas for economic and social development.

Migrants possess real and substantial resources, both in financial terms, as illustrated by the level of official transfers to developing countries, which the World Bank has estimated at USD 372 billion in 2011, and in terms of human capital, with nearly a third of recent migrants in OECD countries being university graduates, as opposed to an average of fewer than 6% in their home countries. In addition, migrants are sometimes key players in trade links between their home and destination countries, and some of them initiate projects that can expand employment and infrastructure, at the local level in particular. Nevertheless, the contribution of migrants, and more broadly of diasporas, to their home countries' economic and social development depends on many factors, such as the size, skill level, duration of stay in the host country and the degree of organisation of the communities involved. It also hinges crucially on the economic, social and political conditions prevailing

in their home countries, as well as the support provided to expatriate communities.

A number of studies aiming to identify more clearly the policies likely to exploit the development potential of diasporas have been published in recent years (*e.g.* Agunias and Newland, 2012; JMDI, 2011; Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Newland, 2010; and Kuznetsov, 2006). Thanks to this research, a vast body of experience – some successful and some less so – has accumulated, and channels through which diasporas can make their contributions have been identified. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical information on target-population profiles is systematically identified as a major obstacle. In order to close the gap, the OECD and the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) have joined forces to construct the most comprehensive and detailed possible source of information, by country of origin, on migrants in OECD countries.

These new data confirm the emergence of new migration patterns, which prompt a revisit of the conditions under which migrants and their descendants can contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of their countries of origin. In this policy brief, special emphasis will be put on the mobilisation and exploitation of the skills of migrants and diasporas, from both an economic and a social standpoint (see Box below). In contrast, monetary aspects, which are well documented elsewhere, will not be covered. Rather than attempting to compile a catalogue of good practices, the purpose of this paper is to propose new options for government policies that could better harness the skills of diasporas to foster development in their countries of origin.

The first part of this paper will trace a broad outline of the skill profile of migrants, seeking to isolate the most important recent developments. The following two sections will endeavour to draw lessons from these changes for mobility and for the mobilisation of expatriate skills. A final section will look more specifically at the role of, and at co-operation between, the multiple parties involved in harnessing the skills of diasporas to foster development.

Migrants/Diaspora, Skills/Education: a question of definitions… and available data

The term “migrants” refers to persons who live in a country other than the one in which they were born. Migrants are thus persons born abroad, regardless of their nationality. The notion of “diaspora” covers a broader population which, in theory, includes all persons who maintain ties of some kind with a specific country of origin in relation to their migration background. Members of a diaspora can be migrants themselves or migrants’ children or grandchildren not born abroad. Some of these persons hold the nationality of their country of residence; others have more than one nationality and still others only that of the country where they currently reside. In practice, due to gaps in available data, analyses often lump migrants and diaspora members together. This paper has been compiled using data concerning mostly migrants but which also take into account their descendents (native-born children of immigrants). Nonetheless, the population targeted by the public policies discussed in this report corresponds to the concept of diaspora as it is defined here.

The notion of “skills” also needs to be clarified. In theory, the term should be understood in its broadest sense, taking into account the level of education, as well as professional skills and, more generally, technical, entrepreneurial and organisational know-how which migrants and their children have acquired[1]. Data available to analysts measure educational attainment, usually on the basis of the highest level of formal qualifications obtained, and professional skills, particularly for persons in employment, but only partially address the other aspects[2]. Again, the public policies discussed in this report aim to mobilise all skills of diasporas, including those which currently elude existing measurement instruments.

1- See OECD (2012a) for a more detailed discussion of the notion of “skills”.

2- The OECD’s new Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) will expand this analysis in the near future by developing objective indicators for a whole range of skills. Initial results from the survey will be published in autumn 2013.

BETTER IDENTIFYING MIGRANTS AND THEIR SKILLS

1. Improving data – the key to a better understanding of diasporas

Over the past two decades, statistical data on international migration have been the focus of special attention which has given rise to notable progress, with regard to knowledge both of migration flows and of the main features of immigrant populations and their children, by country and/or major region of origin. Data from censuses and/or population registers, supplemented by those from labour force or household surveys, can yield a better understanding of the migration pathways and occupational experience of immigrants from any given country, through variables such as the length of stay, the level of education and skills and the country where the education was obtained.

For several years, the OECD and the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD) have invested substantially in this area, compiling detailed data from population censuses for 2000/2001 and 2005/2006 for 200 migrant regions or countries of origin. This database, combined with other sources of information, led to the recent publication of a set of country notes by country of origin, highlighting recent migration trends (including foreign students) and diasporas residing in OECD countries, by the number of persons involved (including children of immigrants) and their main characteristics (age, gender, education, labour-market status, occupation and degree of over-qualification) (OECD/AFD, 2012)[3].

These data are useful for countries of origin, which now possess more detailed information about the main characteristics of their emigrants, and especially their educational levels and labour market integration. They reveal a number of surprises but also make it possible to measure and to confirm a number of major trends (see Box on the following page). In addition, enhanced knowledge of immigrant profiles, in combination with information about the education and skill levels of persons remaining in home countries, also provide input for measuring the extent of "brain drain" from emigration rates by skill level and/or by occupation, by country and/or region of origin, and for highlighting risks by monitoring the evolution of these rates over time.

3- Other projects are also underway, including one in Latin America (*e.g.* www.observatoriodiasporas.com) to set up diaspora observatories which will ultimately be able to provide continuous monitoring.

Did you know?

- In 2010 the total number of migrants worldwide was estimated at 214 million, of whom 147 million were born in a country of the South; of these, half (73 million) now live in another country of the South.
- In 2005/2006, more than 95 million migrants aged 15 or over were living in OECD countries, accounting for almost 11% of the total population of those countries. Estimates for 2010 put this figure at over 105 million.
- Between 2000/2001 and 2005/2006 the Latin American community living in OECD countries grew faster (+5.9 million) than the migrant population born in Asia (+4.4 million). Migration inflows recorded in OECD countries in 2010 show that one in every ten permanent migrants is Chinese and that one in 20 is Indian.
- Migrants in OECD countries are on average better qualified than the native-born population. 28% of migrants are higher education graduates, compared to 24% of their native-born counterparts.
- 51% of immigrants in OECD countries are women, 75% are aged 15 to 64 (13% are aged between 15 and 24). More than one-sixth of migrants have lived in the host country for less than five years.
- Among recent migrants, the proportion of higher-education graduates is slightly greater for women (33%) than it is for men (31%).
- Among recent immigrants in OECD countries, there are more higher-education graduates from Africa (almost 500,000) than from China (320,000), but fewer than from India (550,000).
- On average, around 10% of migrants from Africa and Latin America with higher-education degrees live in an OECD country. However, for similarly educated migrants from Asia the figure is less than 4%.
- The highest emigration rates for skilled migrants are recorded in small island countries, notably in the Caribbean (e.g. Barbados 83%, Guyana 79% and Haiti 75%).

Sources: UNDP (2012), Widmaier and Dumont (2011), OECD/AFD (2012).

2. More highly educated migrants coming from more diverse origins

In 2005/2006, over 26 million migrants with higher-education degrees were residing in the main OECD countries, and over 1 million of them had doctorates. The largest group of skilled migrants was of Asian origin (33%, or 8.5 million people), but there were also more than 4 million skilled migrants from Latin America and 2.5 million from Africa. The European OECD countries attract proportionally fewer skilled migrants than the main settlement countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), and the differential is particularly sharp with regard to migrants from the Maghreb or from Central and Eastern European countries (See Figure on the following page). In all, over half of the skilled migrants (56%, or 14.5 million people) were living in either the United States or Canada.

One-third of recent immigrants in OECD countries (*i.e.* immigrants having arrived less than five years ago) are tertiary educated – a cohort of 5.2 million people. On average, the proportion of higher-education graduates is greater among recent immigrants than for the native-born populations of the OECD countries (24%) or for longer-standing immigrant communities (27%), reflecting both the selective nature of migration to OECD countries and the increase of the education level of young people in countries of origin. Moreover, this pattern has been on the rise, especially with the economic crisis that has afflicted the main host countries since 2007/2008, and more broadly, it reflects the heightened competition amongst destination countries, including emerging economies, to attract and keep talented people. Countries of origin need the means

Distribution of the migrants by education level according to the region of origin and destination, 2005/2006



Notes:
ISCED - International Standard Classification of Education.
ISCED 0/1/2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic education or less;
ISCED 3/4 Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education;
ISCED 5 First stage of tertiary education;
ISCED 6 Second stage of tertiary education.
For European OECD countries, no distinction was made between ISCED 5 and 6 in the case of Germany. Settlement countries include Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand.

Source: DIOC 2005/2006, LFS 2006

to monitor these trends "in real time" so as to gauge the extent of brain drain and adjust their policies accordingly[4]. From this standpoint, information exchange with destination countries, whose statistical systems are in many cases more elaborate, is crucial.

This trend is also reflected in the distribution of migrants by occupation. Annex (see page 27) shows that a large number of migrants hold skilled jobs, especially in the health care and education sectors, in OECD countries. In Europe, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, an average of nearly 16% of immigrant workers of Asian or

4- Some recent analyses draw attention to possible "brain gain" effects that would derive from an increasing demand for tertiary education in origin countries associated migration opportunities for the highly skilled. Available evidence, however, remains limited and shows than brain gain may apply only when the skilled emigration rate is not too large (Beine, Oden-Defoort and Docquier, 2011).

sub-Saharan African origin (and 13% of those from Middle Eastern or North African countries) are employed as professionals and over 11% as technicians. In the United States, nearly one out of every six African immigrants is a professional in either the health care or education sectors, 10% of Asian immigrants are in the IT sector, and 12% of Middle Eastern and North African nationals have managerial responsibilities. This observation reveals both the extent of immigration in certain highly skilled professions and the volume of human resources that can potentially be tapped through targeted policies.

Another salient fact concerns the growing number of migrant women, no longer induced to move for family-related reasons, but increasingly for employment, especially in the case of skilled women. Nearly 4 million women with higher-education degrees settled in OECD countries between 2000/2001 and 2005/2006, 1.7 million of whom came from less-developed countries and over 700,000 from India. In recent flows, the proportion of skilled migrants is in fact higher for women than for men (33% versus 31%). In Canada, Australia, Ireland and the United Kingdom over half of recent migrants are graduates of higher education.

Without extensive research, it is difficult to ascertain whether skilled migrant women have greater or lesser ties to their home countries, and are more or less apt to contribute to them than their male counterparts. This will depend on both the circumstances of their migration and the conditions prevailing for women in their home-country labour market. Nonetheless, the fact that women account for a rising proportion of the flows of skilled workers should prompt exploration of the particular means that could be used to harness this substantial and growing component of diasporas.

Another major trend involves foreign students, whose numbers have risen continuously over the past decade. According to data from UNESCO, OECD and Eurostat, of the 3 million foreign students residing in OECD countries in 2010 (versus 1.6 million in 2000), over a quarter were either from China or India. International students

Main Characteristics of Migrants in the OECD by Region of Origin, 2005/2006 (percentages)

Region of Origin		Men	Young persons aged 15-24	Recent immigrants
Asia and Oceania	Total High-educated	47.3 49.9	12.5	20.9 23.5
Non-OECD European and central Asian countries	Total High-educated	47.8 46.6	14.6	15.0 20.1
Middle East and North Africa	Total High-educated	53.8 58,4	10.2	17.1 16.8
High-income OECD	Total High-educated	47.2 48.7	9.0	16.8 22.2
Latin America and the Carribean	Total High-educated	51.1 45.9	14.6	21.3 21.0
Sub-saharan Africa	Total High-educated	52.6 56.7	14.7	25.8 22.6
Total	**Total** **High-educated**	**49.1** **49.4**	**12.4**	**19.1** **21.9**

Note: High-educated refers to foreign-born that have completed at least tertiary education, which corresponds to ISCED 5 or ISCED 6.
Source: DIOC 2005/2006

are well represented in all of the main fields of study, and differences in specialisation as compared to the overall student population are generally not substantial – at least in the aggregate. Foreign students are, however, over-represented in the fields of social sciences and business, as well as in scientific and technical fields.

International students account on average for over 6% of the total student population of OECD countries and constitute potentially a major source of highly-skilled labour for those countries. In recent years, most host countries have made it easier for students to change their immigration status after completing their studies, so as to allow this pool of skilled labour to settle there. Preserving ties with young people studying abroad, both during and after their education, can therefore prove increasingly crucial for countries of origin. This issue will be discussed in greater depth in the next section.

Also noteworthy is the sharp rise in the number of native-born children of immigrants (15 years old and above), of whom it has been estimated there is a combined total of over 48 million in all OECD countries. Of these, 19 million have parents born in countries outside the OECD area. Mexico has over 8 million descendents of immigrants living in OECD countries; the figure exceeds 1 million for descendents of immigrants from Turkey, India, Algeria, the Philippines and Morocco. For smaller countries such as El Salvador (680,000), Jamaica (450,000) and Haiti (310,000), communities of descendants of emigrants are clearly more limited in number but proportionally substantial. Some countries, such as Lebanon and China, have diasporas that are larger but highly dispersed (outside the OECD area as well). In some cases they have been established for several generations[5] in their countries of residence. In most countries, children of immigrants have higher levels of education than their parents, who arrived at a time when labour migration consisted largely of low-skilled workers employed in manufacturing, construction or agriculture.

Immigrants' children born in host countries may maintain strong ties with their parents' countries of origin[6]. They may travel for short stays and get involved with non-governmental associations to take part in special projects or to develop productive activities. Immigrants' descendents are often citizens of their parents' country of origin or hold dual citizenship, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the host country. Having more than one citizenship provides for the possibility of greater mobility between countries and fosters development of a dual culture, in particular with respect to language, which facilitates economic and social transfers. Behaviour patterns within diasporas change rapidly, driven by young people of the second, if not third, generation, who readily proclaim their intention of contributing their talents to the development of their country of origin or that of their parents, *e.g.* by developing productive projects.

This brief overview has provided an initial illustration of the scope of the changes at work with regard to the profile of migrants and the growing importance of the second and third generations. The following two sections will endeavour to ascertain the policy implications of these changes, making a distinction between two main axes: bolstering the international mobility of skills and harnessing diasporas, which in many cases have become firmly established in their destination countries.

5- The Chinese diaspora has been estimated at 35 to 40 million people, three-quarters of whom are to be found in Asia (Ma Mung, 2009). For its part, the Lebanese diaspora is estimated at 3 to 4 million people (Verdeil et al, 2007)

6- The TEO survey reveals, for example, that in France 9% of immigrants and 7% of their children contribute to collective projects for the building of infrastructure in their home countries. Between 13 and 14% of them say they want to leave France to live elsewhere; 88% of immigrants and 58% of their children have personal contacts outside of continental France via the post, telephone or Internet, versus only 29% of the native-born population having no migration in their ancestry (Beauchemin, Lagrange and Safi, 2010).

FACILITATING SKILL TRANSFERS AND MOBILITY

The prevalence of massive underemployment in developing countries, which affects young graduates in particular, and the persistence of sectoral labour shortages at various skill levels in main destination countries, which were lessened by the great recession of 2007/2008 but will likely soon be exacerbated by population ageing, would suggest that labour migration will persist at a relatively high level in coming decades. So that these changes can benefit all parties involved, *i.e.* countries of origin, host countries and migrants themselves, it is of paramount importance to improve the match between supply and demand with regard to skills, both at the time of departure and upon return to the home country. This is the overriding aim of greater international mobility of skills.

In practice, to move skills from where they can be found to where they are sought is not a simple process. Fulfilling this objective entails improving access to information on job opportunities both in destination countries and in countries of origin, but also improving the match between migrants' skills and available jobs, providing for the evaluation and recognition of qualifications obtained abroad and facilitating recruitment processes. In all these aspects, employers have a crucial role to play.

1. Improving access to information about job opportunities

Traditionally, information about job opportunities abroad is accessed either informally through migrant networks[7] or in conjunction with bilateral agreements to manage labour migration flows. Private recruiting agencies also play an important role in this area, even if the information conveyed is in many cases limited, if not deceptive. For highly skilled workers, even if networks also play an important role, contacts with employers can also be made autonomously over the Internet and/or directly in the destination countries, during study visits for example.

A number of countries have joined forces with destination countries to develop tools for expanding and rationalising information about foreign job opportunities. In North Africa, this is the case for Egypt, for example, with the Integration Migration Information System (IMIS); Tunisia, through the Tunisian Technical Co-operation Agency (*Agence tunisienne de coopération technique,* ATCT); and Morocco, via the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (*Agence nationale de promotion de l'emploi et des compétences,* Anapec) and the Fincome web portal (www.fincome.ma/en/home). Examples In Sub-Saharan Africa include the cases of Benin, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal in connection with the partnership for the management of professional migration (*Gestion des migrations*

7- A study on returned Moroccans showed that two-thirds of the migrants had found work abroad thanks to their personal or family networks (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2012).

professionnelles, http://migrationsprofessionnelles.net/ – in French only), underwritten by the European Union and France. Other countries have developed similar schemes[8], notably in Asia[9]. The most elaborate model, however, is the one instituted under the auspices of the Philippine Ministry of Labour, which can identify, validate and anticipate labour requirements abroad (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration – www.poea.gov.ph).

The impact of these initiatives is in many cases still limited, in particular because of the difficulties entailed in continuously updating the information available, contacting the target populations directly, mobilising employers in the destination countries and stipulating precisely what skills are required[10]. The EURES European Job Mobility Portal (www.eures.europa.eu) provides a summary of the potential value added of these instruments but can pinpoint their limitations as well[11]. The involvement of employers, both as contributors and end-users of these instruments, is determinant to their success.

Building such projects with countries of origin outside the OECD area would entail direct and expanded co-operation amongst national employment agencies, but also vast improvement in the resources and operations of partner institutions in the countries of origin. Within programmes aimed at facilitating legal labour migration, the emphasis should therefore be put on bolstering capacities and establishing networks between stakeholders, on skills development and on making projects sustainable once the external financing comes to an end.

Access to information about job opportunities in their countries of origin is also highly important to those already settled abroad in order to make sure that international mobility of skills is not a one-way street. Migrant workers, and particularly those with technical skills which are often highly sought after, usually have no tangible means of identifying job offers and occupations/sectors that are understaffed in their country or region of origin. Likewise, newly graduated foreign students in the OECD countries are not sufficiently informed of the opportunities available in their countries of origin, in their fields of specialisation and in the public and private sectors.

The Club Maroc France, created at the initiative of the French Embassy in Morocco and the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Morocco, was set up to remedy precisely this shortcoming by forging a web 2.0 link between Moroccan students and graduates of French higher education and economic agents in Morocco (www.clubfrancemaroc.com). While it is difficult to assess the ramifications of this project, it is nonetheless an original and relevant initiative. Along the same lines, student associations in the main universities and centres of higher learning abroad constitute useful avenues of direct contact aimed specifically at young expatriate graduates or descendants of immigrants. More generally, campaigns targeting the most frequented national media abroad, including websites, are necessary to convey information in real time.

However, such an effort requires not only detailed knowledge of the diaspora, so as better to target it, but it also entails being able to identify available jobs. This last point is unfortunately a major obstacle for many developing countries, in which labour market statistics are weak, if not missing. Developing this information is therefore a necessary prerequisite if countries of origin really want to attract expatriate talent.

8- One such example is the AfricaRecruit project, which was developed jointly by the Commonwealth Business Council (CBC) and Nepad (www.africarecruit.com).

9- An example of this is the European Commission-supported AENEAS programme, intended for member states of the Colombo process. The aim of the programme is to facilitate legal immigration by allowing countries of origin to develop operational capacities at home to do a better job of assessing and meeting labour requirements in the main destination countries (www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/facilitating-legal-labour-migration-between-asia-and-the-european-union).

10- Developing tools such as the Operational Directory of Trades and Jobs (*Répertoire opérationnel des métiers et des emplois,* ROME) would give job-seekers a better understanding of the skills, qualifications and conditions for each type of occupation and to adjust their profiles to better suit their migration intentions.

11- The EURES on-line portal gathers job vacancies processed by national Public Employment Services covering an estimated 30-40% of total European vacancies. Around 70% of employers admit to only advertise “specific jobs” via the Portal (EPEC 2010; European Commission 2012).

2. Improving the match between skills and jobs

The question of the match between skills and jobs arises with particular acuity for immigrants in numerous host countries, where substantial over-qualification rates can be observed. OECD work in this area[12] shows that here there is not only under-utilisation of the human capital of immigrants, but also insufficient recognition of their qualifications, even though immigration countries are actively seeking skilled labour. This mismatch between requirements and availability is illustrated by the fact that in the 23 OECD countries for which data are available, 36% of immigrants with a university degree (ISCED 5/6) hold low- or medium-skilled jobs (ISCO-88 level 3 or higher), versus 29% of the native-born population. It is the differential, more than the absolute level, that indicates the scope of the problem. The differential is especially significant with respect to persons born and educated in the country of origin for migrants of North African or Middle Eastern origin, but also for those from low-income countries (see Table below).

The mismatch between skills and jobs for immigrants in destination countries can also impact the extent of remittances they are able to transfer and the applicability of their qualifications in the labour market. While migrants who are well-integrated into the labour market acquire new technical, linguistic and professional skills, those in jobs not corresponding to their qualifications run the risk of incurring a long-lasting loss of human capital.

Overqualification rates for migrants in OECD countries by region of origin (percentage of high-educated working in low or medium-skilled jobs), 2005/2006

	Men	Women	Total
Asia and Oceania	32.2	37.0	**34.4**
Non-OECD European and central Asian countries	46.1	47.1	**46.6**
Middle East and North Africa	33.2	32.9	**33.1**
Latin America and Caribbean	49.0	46.7	**47.8**
Sub-saharan Africa	34.0	33.5	**33.8**
Foreign-born			**36.1**
Native-born			**29.2**
High-income: OECD			**27.2**
High-income: non-OECD			**31.8**
Upper-middle-income			**42.7**
Lower- middle-income			**42.5**
Low-income			**35.7**

Source: DIOC 2005/2006

12- See in particular OECD (2007a Part II, 2012a).

International transferability of qualifications may be problematic, not only because of language difficulties but also because of differences between countries in the content and quality of curricula. This warrants greater attention on the part of destination countries where mechanisms for assessing and recognising qualifications acquired abroad are not always sufficient, and employers are not very attuned to the problem. More generally, destination countries could invest more in promoting language training in countries of origin and destination in order to facilitate mobility and skills transfers in both directions. Moreover, pre-departure training programmes in countries of origin should be refocused on professional training in line with labour-market requirements at both ends of the migration chain, rather than on orientation courses. These training programmes should be designed to reflect employers' needs and be implemented with their support and in cooperation with them.

Yet the matching issue does not only arise in destination countries. Even if few data are available to assess precisely the scope of the phenomenon in countries of origin, it is clear that unemployment of skilled labour is one of the factors behind the emigration of skills. This question arises also at the time of return, insofar as skills acquired abroad are not always recognised and accredited by employers, including in the public sector. This must be addressed more by authorities in the countries of origin, especially with respect to occupations most in demand. This is currently not the case, even in countries that have established the most elaborate re-integration mechanisms.

3. Facilitating recruiting processes and lifting obstacles to return

➔ Recruiting agencies are in many cases an essential component of the migration process, especially in Asia. Abuses are frequent, and the information about working and employment conditions that is given to would-be emigrants is often imperfect, if not erroneous. The example of the Korean employment permit system (EPS) does, however, show that when the recruiting process is well structured and organised in concert with countries of origin, it is possible to reduce the rents captured by intermediaries and to protect and improve the protection of migrant workers as well as the transfer of skills[13]. In this realm, a great deal can also be learned from the case of the Philippines, which is frequently cited as an example. Of particular note is the effectiveness of one-stop shops, whereby all public and private services can be centralised at a single location, and which provide migrants with access to all necessary information, including that about recognition of their qualifications abroad.

The EU Immigration Portal (http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/), launched in November 2011 by DG Home Affairs of the European Commission, intends for example to provide hands-on information for foreign nationals interested in moving to and working in the EU. However, the Swedish immigration portal (www.sweden.se/work), which provides up-to-date information on skill needs and job offers by region, online language training, information on regulated occupations and recognition of foreign qualifications as well as the possibility to apply for work permits online, all of that available in numerous languages, appears as one of the most comprehensive examples of online one-stop shop centres. In developing countries, "migrant resource centres" have also been developed in numerous countries, for example, in India (Kerala), Georgia, the Congo and Mali and, of course, in the Philippines.[14]

Employers play a key role in the selection process but are not always directly involved in bilateral exchange regarding labour migration between countries of origin and host countries. Nonetheless, a number of countries have joined forces with employers to conduct recruiting campaigns in target countries to identify potential candidates and to give them all of the information they need to follow through on their migration plans. Such job fairs are held regularly in some OECD member countries, and certain countries of origin have also developed similar initiatives in the main destination countries in

13- See OECD (2012b, Part III) for a detailed analysis of the Korean work permit system and, more generally, the changing role of Asia in international migration.

14- See Tacon and Warn (2009) for a detailed assessment of these facilities.

order to allow their citizens, and more generally their diasporas, to get in contact with potential employers back home. This is the case, for example, in Romania, where in recent years the Ministry of Labour has held several meetings of this type in Spain and Italy. Even if the size of wage differentials as compared to the pay that prevails in the destination countries is in many cases still a major obstacle, at least these initiatives give diaspora members the chance to reassess the option of going back home. But this must be based on thorough knowledge of the availability and location of diaspora skills and is still contingent on the ability to mobilise employers in the formal sector of the country of origin.

More generally, an emphasis on skills transfers, implies that return migration must be viewed from a development angle for the sake of countries of origin. The existence of job opportunities matching the skills of expatriate migrants would in fact appear to be an absolute prerequisite to any return. Too often, the prospects for going back are limited to entrepreneurial activities. Yet clearly not all migrants have the managerial skills and the necessary financing to undertake such a project[15]. In addition, even if that were the case, any decision to invest hinges on economic conditions and the general business climate. Plans to go back home often involve families and not just individuals, hence employment options for the spouse and, to an even greater extent, access to quality education for children are necessary prerequisites.

Notwithstanding, if these countries want to mobilise some of their citizens who have emigrated abroad and encourage them to transfer their skills, one way or another, so as to contribute to the development of their country of origin, they will also have to identify and eliminate the obstacles to coming back so that the people who do return are more numerous and more “productive” than they are today. Some of these obstacles are administrative, while others stem from recruiting procedures, employment conditions or pay levels. Institutional obstacles are relatively easy to identify and counteract, even if responsibility for them is in many cases shared between the countries of origin and destination. The criteria that govern migrants’ ability to prolong their residency status, for example, play an important role with regard to mobility (dual citizenship, authorised period of absence, multiple-entry residence permits, transferability of benefits and pensions). Indeed, should their homecoming prove unsuccessful, migrants do not all hold residence permits that would allow them to go back to the host country. Yet to keep that option open would eliminate one of the major obstacles to return migration, as shown by the recent example of Poland (see Box on next page).

Other institutional obstacles to returning are to be found in the country of origin. Examples here include tax aspects of financial-asset transfers, property rights (particularly for those with projects in the agricultural sector) or access to housing, education and health care – a problem that may involve other family members who may not be citizens of the country in question. Government policy conducive to the return of migrants or members of the diaspora should therefore assess these difficulties and endeavour to remedy them. On the other hand, experience has shown that the assisted-return programmes that are often deployed to facilitate migrants’ reintegration to the labour market are in many cases costly and relatively ineffective, especially when the return is perceived as something forced, or as a failure of the person’s migration[16].

Many countries of origin, taking a more proactive approach, have instituted special policies to attract returning migrants (such as tax exemptions, housing, social benefits, etc.).[17] But such incentives cannot succeed unless economic and social conditions in the country are sufficiently attractive, insofar as incentives alone cannot constitute a motivation to return. In addition, they

15- While programmes do exist to help returning migrants start up businesses, the effectiveness of such schemes is not always satisfactory, and in any event not all migrants are suited to becoming entrepreneurs.

16- See OECD (2008, Part III) and Matrix insight (2012) for a comprehensive assessment of assisted return and re-integration programmes.

17- For example, in Colombia, the programme “Colombia Nos Une” was launched in 2005. It includes specific measures to attract return migrants and facilitate their reintegration in Colombia (since 2008-2009). Specific centers have been created at the local level to foster reintegration (Centros de Referencia y Oportunidades para los Retornados del Exterior) and recent legislative changes in 2011 and 2012 aim at introducing new incentives for return migrants, including financial ones. China has also developed several programmes since the mid 1990s to attract back foreign trained nationals as well as members of the Chinese Diaspora and the number of returnees has been actually increasing steadily since the early 2000s (OECD, 2012b).

may have a perverse effect by encouraging people to emigrate in order to qualify for assisted-return measures. They can also constitute deadweight losses if migrants who had already planned to return anyway benefit from them. Lastly, they may feed resentment amongst those who have remained in the country and thus complicate the process of re-integrating returning migrants.

It would indeed seem desirable to favour public policies that are applied without discrimination so as not to offer migrants benefits that would distinguish them from and set them against non-migrants. From this standpoint, the aim should be to enhance the country's attractiveness for all parties, first for its inhabitants (to slow rural exodus in the case of rural areas), and then for migrants, both at home and abroad. Identification and wide availability of the information on local investment opportunities could make it possible, for example, to combine pull factors (identification of investment opportunities) with push factors (detecting and supporting prospective investors amongst migrants) to foster territorial development.

Lessons drawn from the return migration of skilled Polish workers

Under the European Union's free movement regime, Poland witnessed major waves of emigration over the past decade. On the whole, migrants, and especially younger ones, were more highly skilled than those Poles who stayed at home. Although many of these migrants took up jobs abroad for which they were overqualified, they nevertheless upgraded their expertise in terms of organisation and the working environment, improved their productivity, developed their entrepreneurial drive and in some cases set up or helped to set up businesses, not to mention the earnings they amassed that were well above wages in Poland. Until 2008 the most developed countries of the European Economic Area were proving to be such a magnet that Poland suffered from shortages of skilled labour. The ensuing financial and economic crisis hit Polish emigrants particularly hard, and some found themselves out of work. Consequently, more and more migrants decided to return to Poland, especially insofar as the country was enjoying above-average economic growth rates compared to the other European OECD countries.

Poland then decided to introduce measures to make it easier for a large number of skilled Poles living abroad to return home. Five key measures helped create conditions conducive to the return of those who wished to do so. These included the setting-up of services to assist migrants in areas such as vocational training, investment advice and business activities. Several other obstacles in the path of returnees were removed: some taxes were abolished, qualifications obtained abroad are now better recognised, and other facilities were made available with regard to the family and schooling of children. Civil servants in some agencies have been specially trained to become more aware of issues concerning returning migrants. Also, general information about economic activity in Poland was made available to migrants considering returning home.

Surveys have been carried out both in Poland and among the families of Polish migrants residing in other EU countries to gain a clearer understanding of the expectations of potential returnees. Initial findings show that, as a rule, economic conditions in Poland are the determining factor. Those wishing to return are manifestly looking for stable and well-paid jobs, and their expectations about returning home are heightened by the fact that they had taken up occupations abroad for which they were overqualified. Furthermore, the highest return rates are not being recorded in those regions where emigration rates were the most pronounced. Also, the share of returning migrants in independent occupations is growing, and in some regions they outnumber Poles in these occupations who did not emigrate (Anacka and Fihel, 2012).

Source: Kaczmarczyk (2012)

MOBILISING DIASPORAS' SKILLS

Not all migrants entertain thoughts of mobility, especially those entitled to permanent residency in their destination country, let alone those who have acquired its citizenship or were born there. But this does not preclude the prevalence of strong ties with the country of origin or the manifestation of a desire to play an active role there. As the case may be, this role can take the form of a voluntary or political commitment, but it can also tie in with a professional or entrepreneurial activity. In the 1990s, this mobilisation was reflected inter alia in the development of diaspora-related professional and expert networks.

By the mid-2000s, hundreds of such networks had been set up, a majority of which were official expatriate professionals' associations with visibility via their Internet sites and involving countries of origin in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Networks for researchers and engineers proliferated in the United States in the 1990s, independently of any formal, direct ties with specific government-sponsored programmes. It was only much later, in the case of India, for instance, that the Indian authorities lent support to these networks, during the 2000s, in the wake of the report by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, which led to creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA).

The Chinese wei guo fuwu ("serving the country") policy ratified the massive expatriation of students in the early 1990s and encouraged them to "reconnect" voluntarily with their homeland. Numerous entities have joined in to nurture this link with the diasporas (assorted ministries, associations, universities, local governments, enterprises, etc.).

This visible part of diasporas, which is often skilled and openly willing to work with and for their native lands, has aroused the interest of political leaders, and a number of governmental programmes have been instituted: Red Caldas de Colciencias (Colombia), Talven (Talentos para Venezuela), SANSA (South African Network of Skills Abroad), Philippines Brain Gain Network, and, more recently, Senegal's Senexpert programme, etc. Thanks to these programmes, new networks have been identified (and in some cases generated) and contacts established with diasporas. The services offered by these networks are fairly varied, and they include exchanges of information amongst skilled experts in the diaspora and the home country, students and government officials and, in some instances, offers of training from the diaspora to local experts, support for investment projects in the country of origin and job-seeking assistance. However, maintaining such programmes and making them viable in the long run is still a challenge. Ongoing funding is often an issue, as is the appropriation by the diaspora of networks built under the auspices of authorities in the country of origin.

Even so, needs are springing up in new sectors and in emerging economies where economic growth requires an influx of skills, and where appeals to the diaspora are becoming more pressing and more specific through specialised scientific and technical networks. The development of thematic competency networks by the ministry in charge of Moroccans residing abroad is one example of this approach.

At the same time, a number of international programmes have sought to enlist the skills of diasporas for short-term missions. The Transfer

of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme instituted by UNDP in 1977 is one such example. It enables expatriates to contribute to projects in their country of origin by returning there for a period of less than three months. Over its first 20 years of operation, some 5000 people have taken part in projects in roughly 50 developing countries. Similarly, the IOM has developed a programme targeting Africa (Migration for Development in Africa – MIDA; formerly the Return of Qualified African Nationals programme – RQAN). Between 1983 and 1999, over 2000 highly qualified Africans have taken part in the programme. Other initiatives have been aimed rather at fragile states in which needs are massive but the obstacles to return also more numerous (see Box below). However, given the efforts and resources deployed, the results have been modest in terms of the number of people mobilised, and the uncertainty regarding the long-term effects.

Diasporas are hybrids: they look to their origins while also looking outward, and in some cases to a large extent. They are not citizens who can be governed as an extraterritorial extension of the national population. On the contrary, they constitute civil societies with multiple allegiances, and for this reason they require special governance (Meyer, 2012). Any thoughts of mobilisation that

The role of diasporas in fragile and post-conflict countries of origin

Diasporas are often asked by the governments of their countries of origin to contribute to post-conflict stabilisation efforts and the development of fragile States by helping to rebuild government structures, promoting the rule of law and taking up management, technical and administrative jobs in key sectors such as health, education and banking. Although diaspora members possess the necessary skills, experience and networks to contribute to the development and establishment of basic public services, their return, especially when viewed as long-term or permanent, can be highly problematic in countries coping in post-conflict situations.

It is essential to identify basic needs and assess shortages that the domestic labour market cannot address. However, in such critical situations, the public sector is often limited in its capacity to assess its needs and the extent of labour shortages. Furthermore, diaspora members have few means of obtaining reliable, up-to-date and objective information. The local environment as well as inadequate administrative agencies and infrastructure may hamper migrants' attempts to transfer to their country of origin the skills, expertise and resources they have acquired abroad.

Attracting members of the diaspora may prove particularly difficult because of the existing political, social and economic climate, unfavourable working conditions, especially inadequate technologies and pay levels, in addition to potentially tense relations with domestic workers. Priority should be given to establishing transparent and fair recruitment procedures as well as employment practices that apply to diaspora members and local workers alike, in order to strengthen the capacities of fragile and post-conflict states while curbing resentment among domestic workers. As a rule, it is vital to strike a balance between the new skills and experience brought in by returning migrants and the contribution of domestic workers who tend to have better networks and a keener understanding of the political climate in the country.

While there is a need for diaspora members to return on a permanent and long-term basis to take up key jobs in certain sectors, it may be possible to consider appointing these people to short-term or temporary positions to accomplish specific missions within tight deadlines. Short-term missions may appeal to people who wish to support their country of origin but also have to take into account the situation and interest of their families. Furthermore, integration, which is often complicated for returning migrants, and even more so in fragile and post-conflict countries, is often much easier in cases of temporary return. In addition, when return migration is not an option, other solutions such as contributing to knowledge networks may also be useful for fragile and post-crisis countries.

Source: OECD (2010)[18]

18- On the same issue, see also for example Horst et al. (2010).

home or host countries may entertain often run up against the fact that diasporas are dispersed, diffuse, unrepresented and largely invisible. As a result, any rigidly administrative approach can easily clash with that reality, impair confidence and wreck attempts to join forces to foster development. Many of the experiments carried out over the last two decades, and particularly those cited above, reflect these difficulties.

In addition, over the course of a migrant's life this feeling of belonging can fade whilst all of the person's energy is spent on integration into the host country – only to surge back with a vengeance once that integration has been successful. Integration is therefore absolutely not an obstacle to mobilising a diaspora – far from it – but ties with the country of origin must be grasped through a complex dynamic that depends both on the migrant's personal history and changes in the economic, social and political climates in the host and home countries.

Initiatives to promote awareness and mobilise diasporas will therefore need to assess ongoing changes, with particular regard to the profiles, situations and aspirations of migrants. Differentiated approaches should be formulated by category (*e.g.* women, students, descendants of immigrants, etc.), taking care not to present the question of return as a prerequisite, and acknowledging the often-hybrid nature of ties to the country of origin and the diversity of the contributions that returning migrants would be able to make (see Box below).

On a general level, it is possible to take better advantage of new technologies in order to maintain ties with and encourage contributions by diasporas through virtual or material transfers. Migrants are increasingly connected (Diminescu and Pasquier, 2010), and new technologies do in fact give rise to highly promising prospects, if only with respect to detecting skills and connecting networks, but also identifying the requirements of emigration countries in connection with their development projects. Rather than databases, which often prove difficult to keep up to date, and which are not really conducive to a feeling of belonging to a dynamic community – which is often a pre-condition for personal and professional involvement – the future is turning towards networks that are more diffuse, such as can be found in the blogosphere and web 2.0. The e-Diaspora project, which has catalogued over 8 000 websites relating to some 30 diasporas throughout the world, clearly shows the abundant resources and vitality of this new universe, in which today's migrants are full participants (www.e-diasporas.fr) – a world that warrants being better understood, not with a view to controlling it, but in order to nourish it with the information it requires to develop and ultimately to produce the desired impact on development in the countries of origin.

Migration, social transfers and transfer of norms

More than the transfer of skills, it is the transfer of cultural models that influences the evolution of societies via new communication media, particularly satellite television. Migrants, notably those long established in host countries, also play an active role in spreading these social norms, although this phenomenon is often neglected and insufficiently studied. Non-monetary social transfers help to promote change-inducing learning processes within families, groups and communities. Migrants can play an implicit role as vector of modernity by influencing ideas, behaviour and social capital in their countries of origin.

Concrete examples of how diaspora can help to bring about changes in behaviour in the country of origin include the importance they attach to children's schooling and the take-up of modern approaches to medicine. Surveys also show that diasporas can influence the use of contraception and, as a result, have an impact on the birth rate in the country of origin by sharing information about practices in the host country (Beine, Docquier and Schiff, 2012).

Diasporas and migrants returning to their country of origin can also influence political and civic life. For example, several recent studies reveal that migrants have the potential to play a leading role in political change in terms of government changeovers, the level of democratisation and the formalisation and depersonalisation of institutions, and that they can also make stronger demands on local governments, particularly with regard to respecting basic rights. Finally, they can spur the demand for more responsible and transparent government.

Source: Chauvet, Dedieu, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps (2012)

BOLSTERING CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION AMONGST STAKEHOLDERS

➔ There are multiple stakeholders likely to become involved in transfers of skills, including migrants and their representatives, national and local authorities in the countries of origin and destination, aid agencies, educational institutions and those responsible for the recognition of qualifications and, of course, public- and private-sector employers. These stakeholders generally pursue diverse objectives having different time frames and entailing highly variable resources. It is nonetheless necessary to reconcile differing approaches and expand co-ordination amongst stakeholders.

In countries of origin, institutions representing their citizens abroad have multiplied in recent years. Twenty-six countries have instituted representation at ministerial level, some of which, such as Mali and Morocco many years ago, and others such as India and Benin much more recently (see Agunias and Newland, 2012). Many countries have set up low-level entities or independent institutions which may report directly to the highest authorities of the state, as in the Philippines, for example. Along with these institutional developments has come a gradual awareness of the extent of the economic potential that these diaspora networks represent. Attempts to control diasporas, which were once perceived as threatening political entities, would seem to be fading and giving way to relations that are more participatory and cross-cutting, in particular by incorporating migration into development planning (GMG, 2010)[19].

Nevertheless, many of the institutions that presumably represent diasporas' interests in countries of origin have limited resources and political clout, except in certain major emigration countries. For their part, some migrants remain wary of these institutions, which can be marked by their own histories or, conversely, too recent to inspire full confidence. From this standpoint, it is essential to get migrants involved in formulating the objectives and projects of the institutions concerned.

Even though their roles should not be overestimated, migrants' associations are also important players[20]. They often constitute invaluable contacts for destination countries, which have direct ties to these organisations. However, not all associations pursue the same objectives. In some cases, the overriding goal is to speak up to host-country authorities on behalf of migrants, whereas for others the main goal is to formulate development actions, often at the local or regional level. It is for example the case in Morocco of the NGO « Migration and Development » (Ould Aoudia, 2012 and www.migdev.org). Another question that arises is that of the representativeness of such associations and the possible selection effects on behalf of certain social, ethnic or religious groups.

19- In this regard, one notable example is the current exploration in Morocco of the possibilities for getting the diaspora involved early, *i.e.* in the very formulation of government development policies (see Latreche and Benhaim, 2009).

20- It is estimated, for instance, that in Mali only 5% of the development projects completed in rural communities between 2004 in 2011 were financed in full or in part by migrants' associations (12% in the Kayes region). ("Continuous modular household survey" – *Enquête modulaire et permanente auprès des ménages,* Emop 2011).

On the European scale, the European Network on Migrations and Development (Eunomad) and in France the *Forum des organisations de solidarité internationale issues des migrations* (Forim) are attempts to amalgamate this diversity. Other types of associations are developing by region (*e.g.* Migrant Forum in Asia), religious faith (*e.g.* International Catholic Migration Commission), country of origin (*e.g. Plateforme euro-marocaine migration, développement, citoyenneté et démocratie*) or region of origin. As a rule, such initiatives lend greater visibility to voluntary action and facilitate interactions with the relevant governments, but they do not always yield the expected synergies, given the diversity of approaches and resources and the lack of co-ordination.

Migrants' associations that are oriented towards the development of its members' country (or region) of origin in many cases exhibit a need for training and a bolstering of capacities when their operations become long-lasting[21]. Apart from the initial actions, which in most cases are humanitarian and one-off, to carry out more complex projects requires skills that migrants do not always necessarily possess. The growing involvement of migrants' descendants, who in many cases are more highly qualified than their parents and well integrated into host-country societies, injects new skills but can pose problems of leadership. More generally, it is important to accompany these changes and to underwrite the actions of associations with support and training programmes that are targeted according to needs.

Local authorities also have an important role to play, and this could be developed further with the support of decentralised co-operation. Decentralised co-operation could in fact offer an ideal framework for lending government support to diaspora members' development initiatives by exploiting the possible proximity between local authorities and associations with a local presence. The difficulties of such decentralised policies stem from the fact that government entities in the South enjoy little autonomy and scant financial resources. In addition, migration stems largely from rural areas in which local communities, in the South and North alike, are in many cases of insufficient size to carry out significant co-operation projects with foreign governments. Lastly, the risk of eviction cannot be ruled out when central authorities see that external resources are providing a partial response to the needs of a given region in which migrants are active and concentrated.

Lastly, conspicuously absent from the discussions, are employers. This stems in part from the fact that a diaspora's potential role all too often revolves around financial support and new business creation. More generally, it is a fact that formal-sector enterprises likely to recruit abroad are insufficiently consulted and involved. The objective of fostering the mobility of skills can be furthered by opening channels of communication with employers so they can express their needs and the constraints they face in harnessing expatriate talent. The public sector must also take part in these discussions, especially in the realms of education and health.

21- The Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has recently instituted an action programme in this realm.

CONCLUSION

Changes in international migration to the OECD countries are continuing, if not accelerating. Migrants are increasingly skilled, as is particularly the case for women, who are also more frequently first-time migrants. Foreign students constitute an expanding population and therefore a potentially substantial resource for countries of origin and destination. This also holds true for children of migrants, whose numbers are large and constantly increasing from numerous countries or regions of origin. In many cases, however, the skills of migrants are not being tapped to their full potential, and substantial over-qualification can be observed, even though competition between destination countries to attract and retain talent is gathering pace. Moreover, the qualifications of migrants do not necessarily correspond to the needs of the countries from which they come, and the question of the suitability of their skills also arises to an overriding extent in the event of a return.

A diaspora's contribution should not be measured merely in financial terms or as input of skilled labour, but, more generally, by its ability to build bridges between countries of origin and destination which convey not only economic activity but transfers of benefits and standards as well. From this standpoint, migrants and their descendants are in a position to act as instruments of change that comprises social, political and environmental aspects.

On the basis of these findings, a number of strategic options can be outlined for refocusing the contributions of migrants and diasporas on the development and internal dynamics of societies of origin. These options revolve around a central objective, which seeks to **better identify needs and the supply of skills so that public policy actions in countries of origin and destination can be targeted more effectively,** and three main axes consisting in (i) improving access to information; (ii) supporting initiatives by diaspora members; and (iii) increasing the involvement of local authorities and employers.

- Pursue efforts to collect statistics on the skills of migrants and diasporas in order to assess the changes at work in recent migration flows and the expectations of migrants, and especially those who settle in host countries permanently.
- Collect more systematically information on the determinants of return migration and reintegration processes.
- Get employers (public and private) involved more directly, to better identify the types of skills that are required and refocus pre-departure training programmes and re-integration programmes in the countries to suit requirements.
- Bolster support for development-oriented initiatives of migrants' associations, especially at the local level, and encourage the vitality of migrants' social networks, especially professional ones.
- Harness new technological means to facilitate the exchange of information within diasporas and with countries of origin, giving priority to support for innovative initiatives by migrants

(a bottom-up approach) rather than creating databases from scratch on expatriate skills (a top-down approach).

- Bolster the capabilities of decentralised co-operation and promote interactions between different types of players and different levels of intervention.

- Facilitate exchanges of information between institutions in countries of origin and destination countries regarding labour needs and the recognition of qualifications and skills.

- Improve foreign students' access to information about employment opportunities in their home countries and develop, in co-operation with employers, recruitment processes in main destination countries, in sectors where demand is substantial and recruiting conditions sufficiently attractive.

- Identify and eliminate obstacles for return migration, including temporary return, with a view of fostering mobility. Limit direct incentives to return that might have perverse effects on emigration, and reassess the cost-effectiveness of assisted-return programmes.

- Acknowledge and harness the contributions of migrants in host- and home-country societies, so as to encourage cross-fertilisation.

Contacts

For more information on this study, please contact
Jean-Christophe Dumont (jean-christophe.dumont@oecd.org, OECD) or
Pierre Robion (pierre.robion@diplomatie.gouv.fr, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agunias D.R. and K. Newland (2012), *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development. A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries,* IOM/MPI.

Anacka Marta and Agnieszka Fihel (2012), "Return migration to Poland in the post-accession period" in Leschke J., Galgoczi B., Watt A. (eds) *Migration and Labour Markets in Troubled Times* (forthcoming).

Beauchemin C., H. Lagrange and M. Safi (2010), "Between Here and There: a Glimpse of 'Transnational' Practices in the Population Living in Metropolitan France" (Chapter 3), in *Trajectories and Origins. Survey on Population Diversity in France. Initial Findings,* INED Working Paper 168.

Beine M., F. Docquier and M. Schiff (2012 forthcoming), "International migration, transfer of norms and home country fertility", *Canadian Journal of Economics.*

Beine M., C. Oden-Defoort, F. Docquier (2011), *A Panel data analysis of the brain gain, World Development,* 39 (4), 523-532.

Chauvet L., JP. Dedieu, F. Gubert and S. Mesplé-Somps (2012), *The migrants as vector of new social and political norms: A review of existing evidence with a focus on Mali and Senegal,* DIAL Unpublished.

DIOC 2005/2006, Database on immigrants in OECD countries (www.oecd.org/migration/dioc).

Diminescu D. and D. Pasquier (co-ordinators), (2010) *Les migrants connectés. T.I.C. Mobilités et Migrations, La Découverte,* février-mars 2010.

Dumont, J.C., G. Spielvogel and S. Widmaier (2010), *International Migrants in Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries: An Extended Profile,* OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 114, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Dumont, J.C., J.P. Martin and G. Spielvogel (2007), *Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain,* IZA Discussion Paper No. 2920, Bonn.

EPEC (2010), *Ex-post evaluation of the Eures programme covering the period 2006-2008*.

European Commission (2012), *Reforming Eures to meet the goals of Europe 2020,* SWD(2012)100.

Global Migration Group -GMG (2010), *Mainstreaming migration into development planning. A handbook for policy-makers and practitioners,* IOM.

Hamdouch B. and J. Wahba (2012), *Return Migration and Entrepreneurship in Morocco*. ERF working paper 666, ERF.

Horst C., R. Ezzati, M. Guglielmo, P. Mezzetti, P. Pirkkalainen, V. Saggiomo, G. Sinatti and A. Warnecke (2010), *Participation of Diasporas in peace building and development. A Handbook for practitioners and policymakers,* PRIO report n°02/2010.

JMDI (2011), *Migration for development: a bottom-up approach. A handbook for practitioners and policymakers,* EC-UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative.

Kaczmarczyk P. (2012), *Return migration and transfer of competencies – the case of Poland,* unpublished manuscript.

Kuznetsov Y. (ed.) (2006), *Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills,* World Bank, Washington D.C.

Latreche A. and R. Benhaim (2009), *Étude sur la contribution des Marocains résidant à l'étranger au développement économique et social du Maroc,* Ministry in charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, Kingdom of Morocco.

Lucas R. E.B. (2012), "The International Mobility of Skills: The Case of Africa", unpublished manuscript.

Ma Mung E. (2009), "Le prolétaire, le commerçant et la diaspora", *Revue européenne des migrations internationales,* Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 97-118.

Matrix insight (2012), *Comparative Study on best practices to interlink pre-departure reintegration measures carried out by Member States with short and long-term reintegration measures in the countries of return,* Final Report, JLS/2009/RF/CA 103.

Mereuta C. (2012), "International mobility of skills: Romania", unpublished manuscript.

Meyer J-B, (2012), *Diaspora, connaissances et développement: comment cultiver le lien créatif?,* unpublished manuscript.

Newland K. (2010), *Diasporas. New Partners in Global Development Policy,* USAID-MPI.

OECD (2007a Part II), "Matching Educational Background and Employment: A Challenge for Immigrants In Host Countries"*, in *International Migration Outlook,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2007b), *Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries,* OECD Development Centre, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2007c), *Gaining from Migration. Towards a New Mobility System,* OECD Development Centre, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2008, Part III), "Return Migration: A New Perspective" (JC. Dumont and G. Spielvogel), in *International Migration Outlook,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2008), *A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century: Data from OECD Countries,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2010), *The Contribution of Diaspora Return to Post-Conflict and Fragile Countries. Key findings and recommendations,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2012a), *Better Skills, Better Jobs, Better Lives, Highlights of the OECD Skills Strategy,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2012b, Part III), "The changing role of Asia in international migration" (J. Chaloff), *International Migration Outlook,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD/AfD (2012), *Connecting with Emigrants. A global profile of Diasporas,* OECD Publishing, Paris.

Ould Aoudia, J, (2012), *La migration, une pratique sociale d'une infinie diversité sur laquelle les politiques publiques peinent à intervenir,* unpublished manuscript.

Plaza S. and D. Ratha (2011), *Diaspora for Development in Africa,* World Bank.

Raunet M., (2012), « Les transferts de compétences », unpublished manuscript.

Skeldon R. (2012), "The International Mobility of Skills: A Note on Matching Supply and Demand", unpublished manuscript.

Tacon P. and E. Warn (2009), *Migrant Resources Centres: An initial assessment,* IOM migration Research series No. 40.

UNDP (2012), *Migrants by origin and destination: the role of South-South migration,* Population facts No. 2012/3.

Verdeil E., G. Faour and S. Velut (2007), *Atlas du Liban: territoires et société.* Beirut: Institut français du Proche-Orient / Conseil national de la recherche scientifique – Lebanon.

Wahba J. (2012), "International Mobility of Skills in MENA: Policy Perspective", unpublished manuscript.

Widmaier S. and. JC. Dumont (2011), *Are Recent Immigrants Different? A New Profile of Immigrants in the OECD (DIOC 2005/2006),* OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 126, OECD Publishing, Paris.

ANNEX

Distribution of employees by occupation and region of origin, persons aged 15 and over living in an OECD country except the United States, 2005/2006

	Asia and Oceania	Europe non OECD	North Africa and Middle East	OECD	Latin America and the Caribbean	Sub-saharan Africa	All regions
Legislators, senior officials and managers	384 062	106 001	204 170	1 090 605	111 082	171 990	2 067 910
Professionals	581 585	243 853	302 906	1 577 663	223 639	293 624	3 223 270
Life science and health professionals	87 883	28 440	61 108	166 499	33 621	52 326	429 877
Teaching professionals	53 658	36 349	62 605	351 351	39 259	62 400	605 622
Technicians and associate professionnals	412 202	351 228	260 568	1 397 249	228 290	252 843	2 902 380
Clerks	424 628	223 123	181 211	949 609	205 099	196 838	2 180 508
Service workers and shop and market sales workers	583 491	520 093	315 508	1 276 318	491 672	213 469	3 400 551
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	80 175	55 249	40 420	222 168	47 783	68 212	514 007
Craft and related trades workers	296 000	796 966	353 258	1 385 133	366 050	187 957	3 385 364
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	390 376	448 194	245 029	907 017	163 436	138 206	2 292 258
Elementary occupations	497 239	874 793	435 140	1 232 968	718 726	336 026	4 094 892
Total	**3 649 758**	**3 619 500**	**2 338 210**	**10 038 730**	**2 555 777**	**1 859 165**	**24 061 140**

Source: DIOC 2005/2006

Distribution of employees by occupation and region of origin, persons aged 15 and over living in the United States, 2005/2006

	Asia and Oceania	Europe non OECD	North Africa and Middle East	OECD	Latin America and the Caribbean	Sub-saharan Africa	All regions
Management Occupations	415 164	64 033	69 372	685 050	349 403	41 543	1 624 565
Business and Financial Operations Occupations	276 719	38 722	24 556	236 340	171 210	27 549	775 096
Computer and Mathematical Occupations	441 230	49 784	20 973	139 433	75 807	19 802	747 029
Architecture and Engineering Occupations	211 851	25 323	24 231	131 660	66 953	13 566	473 584
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations	113 363	14 677	8 755	80 553	30 268	7 532	255 148
Community and Social Service Occupations	37 243	7 697	5 701	77 024	79 224	18 010	224 899
Legal Occupations	24 743	7 251	5 037	50 844	33 392	4 665	125 932
Education, Training, and Library Occupations	204 125	38 816	31 476	330 489	205 588	30 506	841 000
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations	60 202	20 605	11 603	151 681	75 934	7 723	327 748
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations	438 406	47 792	46 815	232 477	221 008	67 184	1 053 682
Healthcare Support Occupations	103 977	29 713	7 165	128 429	253 326	50 861	573 471
Protective Service Occupations	37 544	7 462	6 274	84 880	103 730	17 561	257 451
Food preparation and Serving Related Occupations	296 445	37 803	27 182	902 912	406 960	19 760	1 691 062
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations	113 818	39 748	9 808	1 015 370	650 089	22 511	1 851 344
Personal Care and Service Occupations	250 534	41 770	20 419	284 509	266 292	30 162	893 686

	Asia and Oceania	Europe non OECD	North Africa and Middle East	OECD	Latin America and the Caribbean	Sub-saharan Africa	All regions
Sales and Related Occupations	468 439	74 719	111 678	768 998	534 136	61 214	2 019 184
Office and Administrative Support Occupations	507 413	79 711	50 478	832 964	697 711	60 543	2 228 820
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations	9 323	1 063	159	390 315	35 142	930	436 932
Construction and Extraction Occupations	71 570	47 108	13 239	1 488 649	597 107	8 148	2 225 821
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations	96 492	25 821	14 733	334 458	219 646	10 385	701 535
Production Occupations	386 665	60 743	26 722	1 129 321	493 068	31 736	2 128 255
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations	170 630	52 257	35 066	780 606	506 052	50 234	1 594 845
Total	**4 735 896**	**812 618**	**571 442**	**10 256 962**	**6 072 046**	**602 125**	**23 051 089**

Source: DIOC 2005/2006

Today's migration flows are characterised by a higher level of skill, a higher proportion of women and a broader range of destination countries than in the past. Many migrants have established roots in their destination countries while at the same time are better connected with their home countries because of easier transport and new tools of communication. Other groups of migrants exhibit forms of hyper-mobility, *e.g.* within free-movement areas or as employees of multinationals. The more "traditional" forms of temporary labour migration are persisting, if not expanding, but here too the expectations of migrants with regard to the ties they maintain with their countries of origin have changed, as has the way they conceive of and deliver on commitments to their home communities.

Taking into recent changes in migration flows and stocks the purpose of this publication is to propose ways of thinking about new public policies that could better harness the skills of diasporas to foster development in the countries of origin. These options revolve around a central objective, seeking to better identify needs and the supply of skills so that public policy actions in countries of origin and destination can be targeted more effectively, and three main axes, consisting in (i) improving access to information; (ii) supporting initiatives by diaspora members; and (iii) increasing the involvement of local authorities and employers.

Directorate General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The missions of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs are:

- summarize information on the changing global economy and put it into perspective, prepare decisions;
- on the French government's foreign policy;
- draft France's foreign policy;
- coordinate France's international relations;
- protect French interests abroad and assist French nationals outside France.

The creation of the Directorate-General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships (DGM) in April 2009, as part of the reform of the Ministry, enables diplomacy to anticipate, identify and respond to the challenges of globalisation more effectively.

Confronted with global issues that have a direct impact on the lives of our citizens and multiple actors, the Ministry intends to emphasise the need to tackle global issues, in the firm belief that every major economic, cultural and societal issue calls for collective action with more outward focus, anticipation, interministerial coordination, responsiveness, interdisciplinarity and a resolutely European approach.

Directorate for Communication and the Spokesperson's Office

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr